U.S. military officers can be an asset in a war but it hinges on their ability to adapt to high-intensity, peer-level conflict—something they haven’t faced head-on since the Cold War. Their track record, training, and the evolving nature of great power competition all point to a mixed bag of strengths and challenges.
On the plus side, U.S. officers are seasoned from decades of counterinsurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan, giving them real-world experience in logistics, joint operations, and rapid decision-making. The officer corps is highly educated—over 80% of active-duty officers hold at least a bachelor’s degree, and many have advanced training from places like the Army War College or Naval Postgraduate School. Exercises like the Navy’s Large Scale Exercise 2023 and the Army’s Project Convergence test them against simulated near-peer threats, integrating tech like AI and hypersonics. Against Russia, their edge could come from NATO interoperability and superior command-and-control systems; against China, it’s the Navy’s carrier strike groups and the Air Force’s stealth platforms that could dictate early outcomes.
But there are cracks. The last 20 years focused on low-tech foes, not the industrial-scale warfare Russia or China could bring. Russia’s meat-grinder tactics in Ukraine—mass artillery and drones—demand a resilience U.S. officers haven’t been tested against recently. China’s anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) systems, like DF-21D “carrier killer” missiles, could disrupt the U.S.’s reliance on power projection. A 2021 RAND study warned that U.S. forces might struggle with attrition rates in a prolonged conflict, and officers trained in small-unit tactics may falter in corps-level maneuvers. The 2018 National Defense Strategy flagged this shift to great power competition, but pivoting a massive bureaucracy takes time—some argue too much.
Effectiveness also depends on intangibles. Morale and adaptability matter as much as hardware. Officers who can innovate under fire—like those who retooled air defenses in Ukraine—could turn the tide. But if they cling to outdated playbooks or buckle under political pressure (think Congress meddling in strategy), they’ll flounder. Russia’s officer corps is rigid but experienced in attrition; China’s is untested but backed by a centralized system and growing tech. U.S. officers have the tools—think F-35s, Javelin missiles, and cyber capabilities—but their success rides on how fast they can unlearn the last war and master the next one.
They’ve got the potential to win, but it’s not a sure thing—Russia and China aren’t Iraq circa 2003. It’ll come down to execution under pressure, and that’s where the rubber meets the road.